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The purpose of this paper is to characterize the impact of fraud detection
systems on the auditing procedure and the equilibrium insurance contract,
when a policyholder can report a loss that never occurred. Insurers can only
detect fraudulent claims through a costly audit (costly state veriﬁcation).
With a fraud detection system insurers can condition their audits on the sig-
nal of the system and auditing becomes more eﬀective. This paper presents
conditions under which insurance fraud and the resulting welfare losses can
be reduced by the implementation of a costly fraud detection system in a
competitive insurance market that is supplied by an external third party.
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1 Introduction
Fraud is a well known phenomenon in insurance markets. Policyholders
have the ability to use their informational advantage about the occurrence
of an insured loss to report losses that never have happened. Economists
usually concentrate on an incentive compatible truth-telling mechanism that
induces the agent to reveal his private information honestly. But in many
situations that mechanism is not feasible, especially in the insurance fraud
context, when the principal cannot commit ex ante to his audit strategy.
Townsend [1979] introduced the costly state veriﬁcation approach, which is
used in many environments, like credit markets (e.g. Gale/Hellwig [1985])
and taxation problems (e.g. Mookherjee/Png [1989]). The most important
shortcoming of these earlier approaches is that insurance fraud never hap-
pens in equilibrium, because it is assumed that the principal can credibly
commit ex ante to an audit probability which makes fraud unattractive. The
crucial assumption of that commitment approach means that the principal
either decides prior to the agent’s action or that he can oﬀer contracts with
as p e c i ﬁed audit probability. This kind of modeling is not very realistic
in most auditing problems, because the principal would always revise his
previous decision after the reception of the claims, if this is proﬁtable.
Commitment is a very powerful tool for principals, but the analysis of
auditing problems should concentrate on so-called strategic commitment
devices. If the principal cannot credibly commit himself ex ante to an au-
dit strategy, policyholders will have an incentive to report some fraudulent
claims as Picard [1996] and Boyer [2000] show. The only possible equilib-
rium is a Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) in mixed strategies,
where policyholders defraud and insurance companies audit randomly. A
very interesting feature of the non-commitment problem is that policyhold-
ers are over-compensated for their loss, because the indemnity is the only
device for insurers to limit fraud, as Boyer [2000] shows.
Informative noisy information systems are very common in principal-
agent models. Firstly, this paper concentrates on the impact of fraud de-
tection systems on the auditing procedure of insurers and on the over-
compensation of policyholders. Although some papers, like Belhadji/Di-
onne/Tarkhani [2000] and Artís/Ayuso/Guillén [2002], analyzed fraud de-
tection models, to the best of our knowledge only the paper of Dionne/Guil-
iano/Picard [2003] has taken information systems into account. This is
surprising, because these systems are very popular and eﬀective in existing
insurance markets with considerable size, like the auto insurance market.
Due to the system, the know-how of fraud experts can be duplicated and
1suspicious claims can be identiﬁed more easily. Furthermore, an insurer
can concentrate his audits on more suspicious claims and will obviously not
audit all claims with the same probability and can therefore improve the
eﬀectiveness of his audits. The ﬁndings of Dionne/Guiliano/Picard [2003]
concerning the optimal audit strategy corresponds to ours, but they focus
on the optimal audit strategy and neither regard the impact of the system
on the underlying insurance contract, nor further implementation problems
of the system. Our approach is similar to that of Macho-Stadler/Pérez-
Castrillo [2002], but they refer to tax audits with commitment and risk-
neutral agents. We consider a fraud detection system, which provides noisy
information about the true state of the world. The information of the sys-
tem is observed privately by the insurer and is therefore non-contractible.
This information is modeled similar to Holmström [1979], as an additional
signal that cannot be intentionally manipulated by the policyholder.1
The insurer’s inability to commit himself credibly causes an inevitable
market ineﬃciency. Some proposed solutions for that non-commitment
problem concentrate on the strategic commitment force of external third
parties. For example, a common agency that takes wholly or partly charge
of the insurer’s audit costs and is ﬁnanced ex ante by participating com-
panies might help to decrease fraud as Picard [1996] shows. In contrast,
Melumad/Mookherjee [1989] suggest that insurers can simply sign an incen-
tive-compatible audit contract with an investigator and can therefore com-
mit themselves credibly to any desired audit probability. Both approaches
to overcome the non-commitment problem are not universally applicable.
The ex ante collection of auditing expenditures by the common agency is
impossible in non-regulated markets, where companies compete in premi-
ums, because the transfer to the agency is sunk at the competition stage.
The latter solution of Melumad/Mookherjee rests as well upon very critical
assumptions. First of all, the underlying contract is not renegotiation-proof,
and the principal has incentives to renegotiate the delegation contract. Sec-
ondly, the authors abstract from the moral hazard problem between the
principal and the external investigator.
The main goal of this paper is to analyze the following problems. What
eﬀects does a detection system have on the auditing game and the underlying
insurance contract? How can a detection system with ﬁxed costs be imple-
mented on a competitive insurance market without any market intervention?
As our ﬁrst result shows, an informative system leads in equilibrium - com-
pared to a situation without fraud detection - to a lower fraud and audit
probability, which is quite intuitive. As a further consequence, the strategic
incentive device over-compensation can be reduced with an informative sys-
tem, because auditing becomes more eﬀective. The reduction of the fraud
and the audit probability as well as the reduction of over-compensation de-
pends only on the quality of the signal. We explore conditions under which a
fraud detection system will be applied and give, in addition to Boyer [2000]
2and Picard [1996], a new motivation for the use of an external party, like a
private supplier or an Insurance Fraud Bureau (IFB). The important role
of the third party in our model is to transform the prevailing ﬁxed imple-
mentation costs of a fraud detection system, which can lead to a market
breakdown, if ﬁrms compete in prices a la Bertrand.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we
present the basic model and the optimal insurance contract without a fraud
detection system. Section 3 concentrates on the eﬀects of a fraud detection
system on the equilibrium of the audit game and the underlying insurance
contract. Furthermore, in section 4 we derive conditions under which a
system will be implemented and show how the fraud detection should be
organized. The conclusions follow in section 5.
2 Equilibrium without fraud detection
2.1 The model and the sequence of play
W ea s s u m ea ni n s u r a n c em a r k e tw i t hf r e ee n t r y ,w h e r eI ≥ 2 insurance
companies compete through premium oﬀers. The traded contracts C =
(α,β) ∈ Ψ consist of the premium α ∈ R+
0 a n da ni n d e m n i t yβ ∈ R+
0 .2
Insurers are risk-neutral, they face homogenous and independent risks of
the policyholders, and therefore they have constant marginal costs. If in-
surers charge the same premium, they will share the market equally. In the
Bertrand equilibrium premium oﬀers correspond to the expected costs of a
policyholder and all companies will charge the same premium. In absence
of any ﬁxed costs, what we will suppose until section 4, insurers make zero
expected proﬁts Π(·)=0in equilibrium. The N risk-averse policyholders
are homogenous. Therefore, they have the same attitude towards insurance
fraud3and the same initial income W0. Additionally, each policyholder pos-
sesses a continuous and twice diﬀerentiable utility function u(W) of ﬁnal
wealth W,w i t hu‘(·) > 0 and u“(·) < 0. By their contract choice they
maximize the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U = E [u(W)],
which is a continuous, twice diﬀerentiable and concave function throughout
Ψ.
There are only two states of the world, ”no accident” (ω0) and ”accident”
(ω1),w i t h{ω0,ω1} = Ω. The probability of an accident is π and the loss in
the state of an accident is L>0.I ti sa s s u m e dt h a tt h el o s si sn o th i g h e r
than the policyholder’s initial income L<W 0, and that insured consumers
have private information about the state of world. After the policyholder
has observed the move of nature, he decides whether to ﬁle a claim (m1)
or not (m0),w i t h{m0,m 1} = M. Consequently, the insurance company
has to decide, whether to audit a received claim (a1) or not (a0),w i t h
{a0,a 1} = A. The audit is assumed to be perfect, thus after an audit the
insurer can observe the state of world. The audit costs, which the insurer
3has to bear under any circumstances and which can not be inﬂuenced by
policyholders, are c>0. Policyholders who are caught defrauding must pay
ap e n a l t yk that is sunk and is not collected by the insurance company.4
The sequence of play is:
• Stage 1: Insurance companies simultaneously oﬀer insurance contracts
C;
• Stage 2: The nature chooses the state of the world. This move is
private information of the policyholder;
• Stage 3: The policyholder decides whether or not to ﬁle a claim;
• Stage 4: The insurance company decides whether or not to audit a
claim;
• Stage 5: The payoﬀs are paid and the game ends.
The PBNE of the game consists of sequentially rational strategies given
ab e l i e fs y s t e mµ that is derived from the strategy proﬁle through Bayes
rule whenever possible.
2.2 The claiming game
Policyholders can observe the state of the world. In equilibrium it is quite
obvious, that every policyholder who suﬀered a loss will ﬁle a claim. The
other way around it is trivial, that it will never be a best response for the
insurance company to audit, if no claim was made.5
Lemma 1 The only PBNE in mixed strategies has the following properties:
• The insurance company has sequential consistent ex ante beliefs µ = c
β,
that a ﬁled claim is fraudulent;
• Policyholders will always ﬁle a claim, if an insured loss occurred. Oth-
erwise, if they have not suﬀered a loss, they will ﬁle a fraudulent claim










• Insurance companies audit all claims with the same probability
ν∗ =
u(W0 − α + β) − u(W0 − α)
u(W0 − α + β) − u(W0 − α − k)
. (2)
4Proof. See Boyer [2000]
In equilibrium all claims are audited with the same probability and the
policyholders who suﬀered a loss will always ﬁle a claim and get the indem-
nity, whether the insurer audits or not. But those, who have not suﬀered a
loss, ﬁle a fraudulent claim with probability η∗.
An important point with respect to the following analysis in section 3.3
is that insurers choose their audit probability in order to make policyhold-
ers without a loss indiﬀerent between ﬁling a claim and not ﬁling a claim.
But the relevant probability for these policyholders is the probability that a
fraudulent claim is detected, because their payoﬀs depend on that probabil-
ity. Therefore, insurers have to choose an audit strategy in order to reach a
critical detection probability κc, which makes policyholders without a loss
indiﬀerent between their strategies. In the case without fraud detection
this distinction is irrelevant, because κc corresponds to the optimal auditing
probability (2).
2.3 The equilibrium insurance contract
The insurer has to design a contract as a combination of coverage and pre-
mium which maximizes the policyholder’s expected utility. Because of the
non-existence of any ﬁxed costs, the unique symmetric equilibrium premium
oﬀer of all I insurers corresponds to the constant marginal costs of a pol-
icy. Since the premium equals the marginal costs of a policy, insurers make
an expected proﬁt of zero. Until section 4, we will abstain from taking
a closer look at the competition between insurers and therefore impose a
zero expected proﬁts constraint. The designed contract, in particular the
indemnity β, alters the payoﬀs of the policyholder and inﬂuences the equi-
librium randomization of the insurer and the policyholder. In the last sec-
tion the equilibrium strategies for a given contract were speciﬁed. If insur-
ance is sold at a fair premium, risk-averse consumers maximize their utility
by a full-insurance contract, but in the considered auditing context over-
compensation is optimal, as the following Lemma shows.
Lemma 2 In competitive insurance markets without fraud detection sys-
t e m st h eu n i q u eu t i l i t ym a x i m i z i n gc o n t r a c tC∗ =( πβ∗ β∗
β∗−c,β∗) entails
over-insurance with β∗ >L .
Proof. See Appendix.
5At ﬁrst glance it seems quite surprising that the equilibrium contract
entails over-compensation. There are two questions:
• Why should the insurer supply contracts that give policyholders more
incentives to commit insurance fraud?
• Why do risk-averse consumers maximize their utility by taking an
income risk?
Firstly, over-compensating the loss does not only provide additional in-
centives for fraud, but it also makes auditing more attractive for insurers.
The diﬀerence between the audit costs and the possible savings from de-
tected fraudulent claims increases ceteris paribus with an increasing cover-
age. Therefore, the equilibrium fraud probability diminishes with an increase










2 < 0 (3)
Over-compensation is optimal for policyholders, because the slope of the
zero-proﬁt premium function is always smaller than that of the fair premium
α = πβ. Hence, for β <Lan increase in coverage raises the expected payoﬀs
and reduces the income risk of a policyholder. Due to the risk-neutrality
of policyholders at β = L, the increase of the expected payoﬀs leads to a
positive marginal utility. Therefore, the optimal indemnity must be greater
than the loss. For β >L , there is a trade-oﬀ between increasing the expected
payoﬀs and risk taking, and there exists a unique optimal contract with
β∗ >L .
The eﬀects of over-compensation are similar to that of the unlimited lia-
bility discussion concerning principal-agent problems. The standard princi-
pal-agent problem has an approximate ﬁrst-best solution without limited
liability, if the penalty is set inﬁnitely high, because that drastic penalty
deters the agent from cheating. In our context the solution works the other
way around. If the indemnity tends to inﬁnity, insurance companies cannot
allow that policyholders defraud, and therefore have to increase their audit
probability which causes a decrease of the fraud probability. The indemnity
cannot be increased inﬁnitely, because the risk-averse policyholder has to
bear an income risk for all indemnities β >L . The binding constraint is the
utility maximization of the policyholder.
63 Equilibrium with a fraud detection system
3.1 Modiﬁcations
Let us assume that insurance companies are now able to implement a fraud
detection system with a given technology that assigns an exogenous signal s
to each reported loss. For the moment, we desist from the costs of the fraud
detection system and specify its properties. But later on, in section 4, we
examine the consequences that the costs of the system might have.
The fraud detection system generates one of two possible signals {s0,s 1}
∈ S, when a policyholder ﬁles a claim. The following analysis concentrates
on the case m1 ∈ M. The whole set of claims consists of two diﬀerent types
of reports:
• truthful claims with the probability p(ω1)=π and
• fraudulent claims with the probability p(ω0)=( 1− π)η.
In addition to a ﬁled claim, the insurance company receives a private sig-
nal from the fraud detection system. The properties of the fraud detection
system are common knowledge. The conditional probabilities of the signal
s ∈ S given the state of world ω ∈ Ω are:
[Insert Table 1 here]
The probabilities imply that the fraction δ (respectively (1 − δ))o fa l l
honest claims get the signal s1 (s0) and that the fraction φ (resp. (1 − φ))
of all fraudulent claims get the signal s1 (s0). The resulting probabilities of
the signals are
p(s1)=δπ + φ(1 − π)η (4)
and
p(s0)=( 1− δ)π +( 1− φ)(1 − π)η (5)
respectively.
We assume, that insurance companies will update their fraud beliefs µ
according to Bayes rule. The posterior fraud beliefs µ(s) of insurers after
observing the signal s are
µ(s1)=
φ(1 − π)η




(1 − φ)(1 − π)η
(1 − δ)π +( 1− φ)(1 − π)η
. (7)
73.2 Sequence of play
The earlier stated sequence of play must be modiﬁed with respect to the
fraud detection system. After the implementation of a system, insurers are
able to audit contingent on the signal. Consequently, after the observation
of the signal they have to decide whether to audit a claim or to pay the
indemnity immediately without any audit.
The sequence of play is as follows:
• Stage 1: Insurance companies simultaneously oﬀer insurance contracts
C;
• Stage 2: The nature chooses the state of the world. This move is
private information of the policyholder;
• Stage 3: The policyholder decides whether or not to ﬁle a claim;
• Stage 4: When the policyholder ﬁles a claim, the insurance company
receives a private signal s ∈ S. Otherwise the payoﬀs are paid and the
game ends;
• Stage 5: The insurance company decides whether or not to audit a
claim;
• Stage 6: The payoﬀs are paid and the game ends.
3.3 The claiming game
The signal of a fraud detection system should carry some relevant informa-
tion about the probability that a particular claim is fraudulent. We assume
without loss of generality that the system is valuable or informative in the
sense of Holmström [1979] and φ > δ holds. Since the fraction of fraudulent
claims in the set of claims with the signal s1 is higher than in set of claims
with the signal s0, it is obvious that fraud beliefs of insurers are higher after
the observation of the signal s1 than after the observation of s0.I n o r d e r
to simplify the analysis, we assume that φ is greater than the crucial detec-
tion probability κc. Consequently, insurers exclusively audit claims with the
signal s1, as the following Lemma states.
Lemma 3 Insurers will exclusively audit claims with the signal s1,i fφ ≥ κc
holds.
Proof. See Appendix.
If the fraction of fraudulent claims in the set of claims with the signal
s1 is higher than the critical detection probability, an insurer will always be
able to make policyholders without a loss indiﬀerent between their strategies
8by exclusively auditing claims with the signal s1. Policyholders have to take
the equilibrium audit strategy of the insurance company, and particularly,
the technology of the detection system (δ,φ) into their account. The lat-
ter is very important, because it has a major inﬂuence on the exposure of
fraudulent claims. As mentioned earlier, the signal has an impact on the
insurer’s incentive to audit. However, after the implementation of the fraud
detection system the structure of the game is unaﬀected.
Proposition 1 If φ ≥ κc holds, the unique PBNE for a given fraud detec-
tion system with φ > δ has the following properties:
• The insurance company has an ex ante sequential consistent fraud be-
lief µ = δc
φβ−[φ−δ]c;














u(W0 − α + β) − u(W0 − α)





which leads to an overall audit probability
ν∗ =
δβ
φβ − [φ − δ]c
κc. (10)
Proof. See Appendix.
Not surprisingly, a perfect fraud detection system (δ =0 )leads to a
fraud probability η∗ =0 , because there is no trade-oﬀ for insurers, when
they audit claims with the signal s1, since all claims with that signal are
fraudulent. Auditing all claims with the signal s1 leads to a higher detection
than the critical detection probability. Therefore, it is a dominant strategy
for policyholders to only ﬁle honest claims. Thus, in equilibrium the insur-
ance company does not receive the signal s1 and no audit is necessary. In
any other case the system is not perfect, and in equilibrium insurers audit
and policyholders defraud with a positive probability.
An increase (decrease) of φ leads to a decreasing (increasing) fraud,
conditional audit and overall audit probability. An increase (decrease) of δ
raises (diminishes) the fraud and overall audit probability, since the fraction
of honest claims in the set of claims with the signal s1 increases (decreases).
At ﬁrst glance, it is surprising that the conditional probability ν∗(s1) is
9unchanged by a variation of δ. But policyholders without a loss choose their
fraud probability in order to make insurers after the observation of the signal
s1 indiﬀerent between their strategies. Hence, they compensate the lower or
higher incentives of insurers to audit claims with the signal s1 by a variation
of the fraud probability. The overall audit probability rises (declines) ceteris
paribus with an increasing (decreasing) fraction δ, because insurers get the
signal s1 more (less) often and audit all claims with that signal s1 with the
same conditional probability as before. This argumentation explains why
the fraud probability is only zero, when δ =0holds. This case is the only
situation where policyholders without a loss are not able to keep insurers
indiﬀerent between their strategies.
3.4 The equilibrium insurance contract
The signal is non-contractible, because it is private information of the in-
surer. For that reason, we can derive the optimal insurance contract ˆ C in
the same way as in section 2.3 and maximize the expected utility of the
policyholder under the zero proﬁt constraint of the insurance company.
Corollary 1 If there is an informative fraud detection system with φ > δ,





ˆ β−c , ˆ β
¶
has the following properties:
• As long as δ > 0, the system is imperfect, and the optimal contract
entails over-insurance with ˆ β >L ;
• If and only if δ =0 , the system is perfect, and the optimal contract
entails a fair premium and full insurance with ˆ β = L;
• The premium and the indemnity increase (decrease) ceteris paribus in
δ (φ). Consequently, the optimal contract with an informative detec-
tion system entails less over-insurance and a lower premium than the
optimal contract without fraud detection.
Proof. See Appendix.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The motivation of over-compensation a sg i v e ni ns e c t i o n2 . 3s t i l lh o l d s ,
but the extent of over-compensation for an informative fraud detection sys-
tem can be reduced, due to the decreased incentives of the policyholder
to commit fraud. For that reason, over-compensation and fraud detection
are two strategic devices that help to reduce insurance fraud. Our ﬁndings
are in the spirit of Demougin/Fluet [2001]. Among other things, they ana-
lyze the impact of diﬀerent information gathering costs (like monitoring or
10auditing) on the optimal auditing-incentive-mix in a hidden action principal-
agent relationship, where both parties are risk-neutral and the agent faces
a limited liability constraint. In our model the agent is risk-averse, and the
exogenous penalty is an implicit limited liability constraint. Therefore, the
insurer as the principal has to use other monetary incentives to reduce the
costs of fraud. Another diﬀerence compared to our approach is that over-
compensation is used as an indirect incentive for the principal to audit and
not as an incentive for the agent to choose a higher eﬀort level. The results
are very similar, because, if an informative signal is available, the principal
will use more auditing and less monetary incentives to reduce the informa-
tion rent of the agent. The meaning of ”more auditing” is only valid in a
wider sense here, because of the strategic auditing game. The better infor-
mation of the insurer however leads to a reduction of over-compensation.
4 The organizational design of fraud detection
The eﬀectiveness of the fraud combat is very sensitive to its organizational
design. There are many approaches addressing whether or how a third party
can help to mitigate the market ineﬃciency caused by the non-commitment
problem of the principal. In Picard’s view, the non-commitment problem can
(partly) be solved by a common agency created for all insurance companies,
that does not audit, but (partly) takes charge of the audit expenditures and
is ﬁnanced by the whole market through partition fees. However, such a
solution is only valid for regulated insurance markets. A diﬀerent approach
employed by Melumad/Mookherjee [1989] suggests, for the case of a tax
audit, that the authority can delegate the auditing job to an independent
investigation agency. But such a delegation causes additional agency costs,
because the investigator gets an incentive compatible audit contract. This
solution is not really convincing for two reasons that the authors concede.
Firstly, it is not renegotiation-proof, because the insurer has an incentive
to privately renegotiate the contract with the audit agency after the audit
contract is publicly signed. Secondly, Melumad/Mookherjee abstract from
the moral hazard problem between the insurer and the agency. In light of
this criticism, their results cannot really explain the existence of an IFB,
as the non-commitment problem also arises in the proposed solutions. A
further weighty shortcoming of both solutions is that they disregard from
the resulting costs and, more importantly, from the impact of the costs on
the market equilibrium.
During this section, we present how a fraud detection system can and
will be implemented in insurance markets when it mainly causes ﬁxed costs.
Our approach will ﬁt to the two oppositional legal frameworks for markets in
the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). In the United States
many federal states have established State Insurance Fraud Bureaus that
11support the ﬁght against insurance fraud or perform investigations. Such a
market intervention can be welfare improving, when insurers face diﬀerent
auditing costs, as Boyer [2000] shows. Within the EU, it is nearly impossible
to enforce a market intervention and/or merely a private cooperation of
insurers. Every company performs its own audits, and there is no way to
commonly develop or run a detection system. But as we can observe, there
are some ways to implement such a system. For example, in Germany a
commercial reinsurer developed a system and sells it to European insurance
companies even when they are not their customers.
In contrast to Boyer [2000], we do not consider diﬀerent audit costs of
insurers, because we have assumed that they are completely homogenous.
A detection system which can be implemented assigns a signal to all claims
prior to an audit decision. Insurers have to accept or reject a participation
contract oﬀer of a supplier to pay a ﬁxed charge for using the system and/or
a variable charge for each signal that the systems refers. Within this paper,
we characterize situations where the system can and will be implemented
in competitive insurance markets, but our solution is also valid in regulated
markets.
In addition to the information about the probability of a fraudulent
claim, the fraud detection system will usually generate relevant information
for the audit itself. Therefore, we could assume that the audit costs after
the implementation of the systems would be lower than before. But the
system will cause some costs of data input, because the relevant facts of the
c l a i mm u s tb ea v a i l a b l ef o rt h es y s t e m . F i n a l l y ,w es u p p o s et h a tt h et w o
eﬀects lead to the same audit costs c. More relevant than the per unit audit
costs are the ﬁxed costs of developing and implementing the system.6For the
remainder of the section we will concentrate on the arising problem of the
ﬁxed costs of fraud detection.
I nt h ep r e s e n c eo fﬁxed costs, the existence of a competitive market
equilibrium is questionable, because the ﬁxed costs are sunk at the pre-
mium competition stage. In the case where only one insurer can invent
and implement the system at some ﬁxed costs D, he will undercut all other
companies and will force them to withdraw from the market, because of his
reduced marginal costs and charges αM = α−ε.T h i sm a r k e tc o n ﬁguration
is only feasible in the sense of Baumol/Panzar/Willig [1982], if the market
has a considerable size and no capacity constraint is present. In equilibrium
the monopoly insurer will make an expected proﬁt:
Π = N [ˆ α − αM] − D ≥ 0, (11)
for some N.
For the remainder of the section, we will concentrate on the case, where
an external supplier invents and implements an informative fraud detection
system with a given technology. To simplify matters, we set D =1without
12loss of generality. The supplier oﬀers every insurer a participation contract
P =( F,f) that entails a ﬁxed fee F for using the system and a variable
fee f for every signal s t h a tt h es y s t e mr e f e r s . T h es e q u e n c eo fp l a yi sa s
follows:
• Stage 1: The supplier oﬀers the contract P to all insurers;
• Stage 2: The insurers decide simultaneously whether or not to accept
the oﬀered contract;
• Stage 3: Insurance companies simultaneously oﬀer insurance contracts
C;
• Stage 4: The nature chooses the state of the world. This move is
private information of the policyholder;
• Stage 5: The policyholder decides whether or not to ﬁle a claim;
• Stage 6: If the policyholder ﬁles a claim, the insurance companies that
participated at stage 2, receive a private signal s ∈ S;
• Stage 7: The insurance companies decide whether or not to audit a
claim;
• Stage 8: The payoﬀs are paid and the game ends.
We only analyze stages 1-3, because they determine whether the system
can be implemented or not. There are only two possible types tj,j=0 ,d
of insurances companies that can oﬀer insurance contracts, where 0 denotes
companies without and d companies with a fraud detection system. Next,
we exclude dominated participation contracts, that can never be a part of
an equilibrium of the whole game of stages 1-3.
Lemma 4 The optimal participation oﬀer entails no ﬁx participation fee F.
Proof. See Appendix
Due to the Bertrand competition, there is no way that insurers can en-
gage in activities that cause any ﬁxed costs, because at the competition stage
such ﬁxed costs are sunk. Consequently, the insurer can only oﬀer insurance
coverage at marginal costs and makes expected losses in the amount of the
ﬁxed costs. The only possibility to implement the system is to transform
ﬁxed into variable costs. Hence, the external supplier should implement the
system centrally and charge insurers a fee f for each received signal. A
market equilibrium with fraud detection can only be reached, if:
13i. The market conﬁguration with fraud detection is feasible and sustain-
able, and consequently the marginal costs with fraud detection are
lower than without.
π
φβ − [φ − δ]c
φ[β − c]











If condition (C1) holds, there will be no market conﬁguration where an
insurance company can make expected proﬁts by not participating in the
fraud detection system and undercutting the other companies. On the other
hand, as can be seen from (C2), if the market size (number of policyholders)
does not exceed a critical value, no fraud detection will be introduced.
Proposition 2 A sustainable market equilibrium with fraud detection by all
insurance companies is feasible, if and only if the insurance market has a
considerable size.
Proof. In Bertrand equilibrium the premium oﬀer corresponds to the
marginal costs of the insurer with the lowest marginal costs. Due to Corol-
lary 1 for some small f (C1) will hold. Therefore, if (C1) holds, no insurer,
whether he participates or not, has an incentive to undercut the premium
αd = π
φβ−c[φ−δ]
φ[β−c] [β + f], because he would make expected losses with such
an oﬀer. If (C1) holds, it is a dominant strategy for every insurance com-
pany to participate. Since f corresponds to the relative development costs,
the market size is crucial, because f vanishes, if N tends to inﬁnity. Ceteris
paribus f declines with a rising market size, and therefore fraud detection
is becoming more advantageous.
Insurers will only accept participation contracts with a variable and no
ﬁxed fee. If the insurance premium with fraud detection and the variable
fee is not higher than the premium without fraud detection, all insurers will
accept the participation contract. The supplier will only oﬀer such a sys-
tem, if he makes expected non-negative proﬁts with the system. Although
we disregarded from the strategic problem of the external supplier and only
considered a break even situation, Proposition 2 can explain the fact that
fraud detection systems are only used in insurance market with a high num-
ber of policyholders.
145C o n c l u s i o n s
One possible strategic commitment device to reduce fraud in the non-commit-
ment context is over-compensation of the agent, because it commits the in-
surer to audit more often. In this paper, we have characterized the impact
of a fraud detection system on the equilibrium of the audit game and the
insurance contract. We show that informative fraud detection systems are
another possible strategic commitment device to reduce the fraud and audit
probability in the economy, because insurers can condition their audits on
the signal and do not audit all claims with the same probability. Due to
the properties of Nash equilibria in mixed strategies, the detection system
aﬀects the randomization of the policyholders and insurers. Since the fraud
probability and the over-compensation of the policyholder diminish with re-
spect to the signal quality, the non-commitment problem of insurers remains
as long as the signal is imperfect.
The amount and structure of the costs of a detection system is very
crucial in our context. Fraud detection systems base on computer programs
that cause high implementation costs. Operating a system will only be
remunerative, if the beneﬁts from the declining fraud and audit probability
exceed the relative costs of the system related to an individual consumer.
For that reason, the number of policyholders on the market is critical for
the eﬀectiveness of fraud detection. Thus, we can conﬁrm the fact that
fraud detection is only performed in insurance markets with a considerable
size, such as the auto insurance and the workers compensation insurance
market. Moreover, we deduce, that due to the ﬁxed costs of the system and
the Bertrand competition on the considered insurance market, the contract
between insurers and the external supplier of the system can only consist of
a variable transfer from the insurer to the supplier.
The analysis neglects two aspects. First of all, we do not consider any
negotiations. As Macho-Stadler/Pérez-Castrillo [2001] show for the commit-
ment audit case, a fraud detection system which generates an informative
signal, gives the insurer incentives for renegotiations with the policyholder.
After observing the signal, insurers have an incentive to settle with policy-
holders in order to save audit expenditures. The settlement is ex post eﬃ-
cient, but dilutes the deterrence eﬀect of the fraud detection system. Future
research should concentrate on the renegotiation incentives and their eﬀects
in a non-commitment environment. Another shortcoming of our approach is
the binary signal of the system. Realistically, the model should be enlarged
and should consider more than two signals and their impact on the auditing
game. Such an extension will presumably not cause any structural changes of
the equilibrium properties, as the results of Dionne/Guiliano/Picard [2003]
indicate, because insurers would start auditing claims with the highest fraud
belief and go on with claims with the second highest belief and so on until
they reach the critical detection probability.
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P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . The optimal insurance contract maximizes the
expected utility of policyholders
U = πu(W0 − α − L + β)+( 1− π)(1− η)u(W0 − α) (12)
+(1 − π)η[(1 − ν)u(W0 − α + β)+νu(W0 − α − k)]
under the zero-proﬁtc o n s t r a i n t
Π = α − πβ − (1 − π)(1 − ν)ηβ − ν [π +( 1− π)η]c =0 . (13)
The insurance premium can be expressed as a function of the indemnity
by rearranging the zero-proﬁt condition of insurance companies.
α∗ (β)=πβ +( 1− π)(1 − ν∗)η∗β + ν∗ [π +( 1− π)η∗]c (14)


















Since (15) is a hyperbolic function, we will concentrate on the economic
interesting interval β ∈ ]c,∞).G i v e n
β
β−c > 1, the zero-proﬁtp r e m i u m
function α∗(β) is always greater than a fair premium α = πβ. From (16),
we can easily deduce that its slope is always smaller than π. Finally, (15)
has its only minimum in the relevant interval at β =2 c. The second order
derivative (17) is positive for β ∈ ]c,∞),t h u s( 1 5 )i sc o n v e xi nt h er e l e v a n t
interval.
















The concave shape of the utility function u with u0 > 0 and u00 < 0 im-
plies a strictly increasing and concave expected utility function U throughout
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16Over-insurance will be optimal, if the slope of the indiﬀerence curve at




























Clearly, condition (21) is always valid, if c>0.T h u s , t h e o p t i m a l
contract C∗(πβ∗ β∗
β∗−c,β∗) entails over-insurance, because at β = L policy-
holders are marginally risk neutral and only regard the expected change of
their payoﬀs. Since the marginal costs of an increase of coverage ∂α
∂β are
smaller than the marginal beneﬁts π, a further increase of the indemnity is
proﬁtable at β = L.
There exists a contract C∗(πβ∗ β∗
β∗−c,β∗) with an indemnity β∗ >Lthat
solves the ﬁrst order condition
u0
³
W0 − πβ∗ β∗




W0 − πβ∗ β∗




W0 − πβ∗ β∗
β∗−c
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There exists an unique optimal contract C∗, because U is concave while
the zero-proﬁt premium is convex in the relevant interval.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 . The critical detection probability κc makes
policyholders without a loss indiﬀerent between ﬁling and not ﬁling a fraud-
ulent claim. Since no payoﬀs change compared to the case without fraud
detection, the indiﬀerence condition of policyholders without a loss is given
by
u(W0 − α)=κcu(W0 − α − k)+( 1− κc)u(W0 − α + β)] (23)
with
κc =
u(W0 − α + β) − u(W0 − α)
u(W0 − α + β) − u(W0 − α − k)
. (24)
After the implementation of the system, insurers can condition their
audits on the signal. The expected detection probability ¯ κ of a fraudulent
claim is a linear combination of the conditional audit probabilities ν (s)
weighted by the fractions of fraudulent claims with the signal s ∈ S.
¯ κ = φν (s1)+( 1− φ)ν (s0) (25)
17In equilibrium the expected detection probability ¯ κ must correspond to
the critical detection probability of policyholders without a loss κc.U s i n g
(24) and (25) yields
φν∗ (s1)+( 1− φ)ν∗ (s0)=κc (26)
From φ > δ, (6) and (7) follow that the insurer’s fraud beliefs are higher
for claims with the signal s1 than for those with the signal s0. Consequently,
insurers begin to audit claims with the signal s1. In equilibrium the condi-
tional audit probability ν∗ (s0) c a no n l yb ez e r o ,i fi n s u r e r sr e a c ht h ec r i t i c a l
detection probability by auditing claims with the signal s1 exclusively. The
fraction φ must therefore satisfy
φν (s1) ≥ κc (27)
Using ν (s1) ∈ [0,1] leads to the condition φ ≥ κc, which completes the
proof.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . The equilibrium fraud probability η∗ must
solve the indiﬀerence condition of insurers, which is given by
−β = µ(s1)[−c]+( 1− µ(s1))[−β − c]. (28)










Given (29) the resulting ex ante fraud belief µ of insurers is
µ =
(1 − π)η∗
π +( 1− π)η∗ =
δc
φβ − [φ − δ]c
. (30)
After the observation of the signal s1 the posterior fraud belief µ(s1) is
µ(s1)=
φ(1 − π)η∗




The equilibrium audit probability ν∗(s1) satisﬁes the following indiﬀer-
ence condition of policyholders
u(W0 − α)=φν∗(s1)u(W0 − α − k) (32)
+(1− φν∗(s1))U(W0 − α + β).




u(W0 − α + β) − u(W0 − α)





18The overall audit probability is given by proportion of audited claims to
all received claims, which is
ν∗ =
δπ + φ(1 − π)η∗
π +( 1− π)η∗ v∗(s1). (34)
By using (29) and (33) the overall probability simpliﬁes to
ν∗ =
δβ
φβ − c[φ − δ]
u(W0 − α + β) − u(W0 − α)
u(W0 − α + β) − u(W0 − α − k)
. (35)
Since all elements of the PBNE have been found, the prove is done.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1 . The procedure of this proof corresponds to
that of Lemma 2. The zero-proﬁt premium with fraud detection is given by
α∗ (β)=πβ +( 1− φν∗ (s1))(1 − π)η∗β (36)
+ν∗ (s1)[π +( 1− π)η∗]c.
Using (29) and rearranging (36) leads to
α∗ (β,δ,φ)=πβ




If φ > δ, the zero-proﬁt premium with fraud detection (37) is strictly









Given that α∗ (β,δ,φ) is twice diﬀerentiable with respect to β, the partial
























It is convex throughout the whole relevant interval, because (40) is positive
for β ∈ [c,∞) and δ > 0.I n t h e c a s e δ =0 , (37) corresponds to the fair
premium, which is linear increasing in β.



















Over-insurance will be optimal, if and only if the slope of the indiﬀerence






















Rearranging (42) leads to
δ > 0 (43)
If and only if δ =0holds, the detection system is perfect and the zero-
proﬁt premium with fraud detection is fair, which leads to an optimal full-
insurance contract with ˆ β = L.
Finally, we show that over-compensation is increasing (decreasing) in δ












φ2 [β − c]
2 > 0. (45)
The slope of the zero-proﬁt premium decreases ceteris paribus with an
increase of δ. Therefore, the zero-proﬁt function gets ﬂatter which implies
an increase of the optimal indemnity. The other way around, the zero-proﬁt
premium function becomes steeper with an increase of φ which leads to a
reduction of the indemnity and over-compensation.
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 . We distinguish the observable and unobservable
contract choice of insurers at stage 2. Firstly, we consider the case, where
the contract choice is observable. By using a backwards induction argumen-
tation, we can exclude any ﬁxed fee F. If insurers accept the contract with a
ﬁxed fee, they will make an expected loss of Πd = −F, because at the com-
petition stage 3 they can only charge premiums equally to their marginal
costs. The strategy to accept that contract is dominated by not accepting it
and to withdraw from the market, which leads to a expected proﬁt of zero.
If the contract choice is unobservable, the relevant strategies of the insur-
ers will consist of a participation contract choice and an insurance contract
oﬀer. At stage 1, the external supplier will only oﬀer contracts that will earn
non-negative expected proﬁts at stages 2 and 3. Therefore, the supplier can
20only oﬀer the contract Pv =( 0 ,f), which entails only a positive variable




and the contract Pf =( F,0), where the supplier only
charges a positive ﬁxed fee F ≥ 1
I. At the competition stage 3, the two
types of insurers can only oﬀer the usual Bertrand equilibrium contracts.
This leads again to the result that the participation contract Pf with a
ﬁxed fee causes expected losses and no insurer will choose any contract with
a ﬁxed fee.
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Notes
1. The presented model is in that way not a signalling game, because
the signal is an exogenous, statistical information generated from the fraud
report, but the policyholder is unable to strategically inﬂuence the signal.
2. The considered insurance contracts are incomplete, because the in-
demnity is state-independent. Actually, insurers could condition the indem-
nity payment on the fact whether an audit took place or not and reward hon-
est policyholders with a higher indemnity (see e.g. Fagart/Picard [1999]).
But a contract with a state-dependent indemnity is incredible, because pol-
icyholders do not know whether their claim was audited or not, and they
have no opportunity to detect this fact. In cases, where an insurer audits a
claim and determines that it was honest, he will keep the audit secret and
save money. The credibility issue that applied to the auditing problem is
a l s ov a l i di nt h i sc a s e .
3. Boyer [1999] analyzes a situation with two diﬀerent types of policy-
h o l d e r s . O n et y p en e v e rc o m m i t si n s urance fraud and always reports the
state of the world honestly. The second type of policyholders is oppor-
tunistic and weighs up the costs and beneﬁts of a fraudulent claim, if no
accident occurred. In this paper we will concentrate on the second type of
opportunistic policyholders.
4. There are two reasons why we assume the penalty k n o tt ob ep a r to f
the insurance contract. First of all, it is usually determined by law and/or
courts. Therefore, insurers would have to renegotiate with fraudulent pol-
icyholders after an audit. Since negotiations cause signiﬁcant transaction
costs and the expected sanction for defrauders in reality is not very high
(see e.g. Derrig/Zicko [2002]), it is questionable whether insurers can collect
the penalty or not. In addition, when a penalty k>cis paid to the insurer,
auditing becomes a rent-extracting device and not a way to induce contract
compliance of policyholders (see e.g. Picard [1996] for a model, where the
insurer partially beneﬁts from the penalty).
5. This result is just technical, because insurers are not able to audit a
claim that was not made.
6. The implementation costs of an existing fraud detection system in New
J e r s e ya r e1 0t o1 2m i l l i o nU S D .T h ep er annum operating costs are more
than twice of the implementation costs (see PANKO, Ron [2001]: Making
A Dent In Auto Insurance Fraud, Best’s Review, October 2001).
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p(s | ω1) p(s | ω0)
s1 δ φ
s0 (1 − δ) (1 − φ)
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Figure 1
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